

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

THE COMMITTEE OF 100 ON THE)
FEDERAL CITY)
Plaintiff)
v.)
)
ANTHONY FOXX, Secretary of)
Transportation, et al.)
)
Defendants)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

EXHIBIT 10

ID 20: Committee of 100 on the Federal City

September 25, 2013

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**Re: Comments of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City on the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement & Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation for the
Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction**

Dear Sirs:

Attached is The Committee of 100 on the Federal City comment on the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction, Draft Environmental Impact Statement & Section 4(f) Evaluation. We appreciate the opportunity to submit this comment and look forward to continuing engagement on the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction proposal.

If you would like to contact The Committee of 100, please email Monte Edwards, monte.edwards@verizon.net, or phone (202) 543-3504 .

Sincerely,

Nancy Macwood

Nancy Macwood, Chair

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No response required for this section of comment

Committee of 100 on the Federal City Comments on the
Virginia Avenue Tunnel DEIS
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No response required for this section of comment

COMMENTS PERTAINING TO THE

VIRGINIA AVENUE TUNNEL RECONSTRUCTION
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
& DRAFT SECTION 4(f) EVALUATION

July, 2013

Submitted to

**FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION**
District of Columbia Division

**DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION**
Project Development & Environment Division

No response required for this section of comment

THE COMMITTEE OF 100 ON THE FEDERAL CITY

September 25, 2013

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Overview

The Virginia Avenue Tunnel is functionally obsolete. Its single track creates a chokepoint for traffic along the East Coast and its inability to accommodate double-stacked containers imposes limits on freight trains traveling through DC to or from points south. CSX is proposing to rebuild the Virginia Avenue Tunnel as part of its National Gateway Project.

While the NEPA process, by law, requires consideration of a “no build” alternative, its function isn’t simply to decide whether a project is necessary or unnecessary. It is to determine, after analyzing a variety of realistic alternatives, the best way to solve specific problems and/or to meet specific needs.

In this DEIS, only one approach is being considered – rebuilding the tunnel in approximately the same location, but with two tracks and sufficient clearance for double-stacking.¹ All three “alternatives” are just variations on this approach. In fact, even the “no build” option is cast in this form – the choice presented is between reconstructing the tunnel in its current location on an emergency basis (the “no build” option) rather than as a planned infrastructural improvement. The rebuilding of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel is treated as inevitable – the only real questions are when and how.

In part, the failure to consider a range of alternatives stems from an overly narrow Statement of Purpose and Needs that focuses only on CSX’s needs, ignoring impacts on other users of rail infrastructure as well as the priorities established by federal and local planning efforts. The DEIS’s tendency to treat the Virginia Avenue Tunnel in isolation, rather than to establish logical termini for analyzing the project compounds this problem.² Finally, the analysis is hampered by the absence of data that is necessary for a meaningful evaluation of the comparative costs and benefits of alternative approaches.

The DEIS, written solely from CSX’s perspective, begs two crucial public policy questions: (1) is it necessary and desirable to increase the volume of “through” freight traffic in the Virginia Avenue Tunnel rather than to reroute freight traffic to avoid this chokepoint? and (2) what long-

¹ As the Capitol Quarter Community Association’s comments point out, the range of alternatives is narrowed even further by the fact that all three build scenarios involve running CSX traffic along Virginia Avenue throughout the construction phase. Even the possibility of temporary re-routing or a partial diversion of current traffic has been taken off the table.

²See 23 CFR 771.111(f):

In order to ensure meaningful evaluation of alternatives and to avoid commitments to transportation improvements before they are fully evaluated, the action evaluated in each EIS or finding of no significant impact (FONSI) shall:

- (1) Connect logical termini and be of sufficient length to address environmental matters on a broad scope;
- (2) Have independent utility or independent significance, i.e., be usable and be a reasonable expenditure even if additional transportation improvements in the area are made; and
- (3) Not restrict consideration of alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable transportation improvements.

Response to Comment 20-1

Chapter 2 of the FEIS was revised to include discussion regarding the independent utility and logical termini of the project.

Response to Comment 20-2

Order of magnitude cost estimates were obtained or developed for the concepts considered for this project. Section 3.3.1.7 of the DEIS addresses this comment.

Response to Comment 20-3

This project’s purpose and need is to address the deficiencies of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Section 5.15 of the DEIS describes how passenger rail and freight coexist in the region. This project does not preclude future discussions on other passenger and freight rail projects.

term impact will this proposed change in infrastructural capacity have on other users – specifically on passenger and commuter rail services? 20-4

Our contention is that any meaningful analysis of the environmental impact of expanding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel must consider the comparative costs and benefits of expanding the tunnel vs. rerouting freight traffic. We also believe that if such an analysis were to be done, the likely conclusion would be that now is the time to separate passenger and commuter rail from freight rail, so that we can meet our expanding needs for both services and to do so in a way that routes freight around -- rather than through -- DC's Monumental Core and population centers. Expanding rail capacity doesn't have to be a zero-sum game that pits freight against passenger and commuter rail. It is in the long-term public interest that we avoid investments that further one of those interests at the expense of the other.

We find the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Draft Environmental Impact Statement to be excessively narrow and self-serving in defining purpose and need, thus failing to consider a number of important factors:

- ♥ The importance of passenger and commuter service and the need to expand those transportation services is not considered.
- ♥ The negative effect of expanded CSX service on passenger and commuter operations is ignored.
- ♥ The safety and security considerations of expanded CSX service are not addressed.
- ♥ The effect of increased diesel emissions due to expanded CSX operations is not addressed.
- ♥ The inability of passenger and commuter rail to use electric instead of diesel locomotives to mitigate those environmental impacts because of CSX restrictions is ignored.
- ♥ Practical options for rerouting CSX that would eliminate the problems of freight, passenger and commuter rail being forced to share the same rail tracks are not evaluated.

20-5

Executive Summary

A series of drafting choices have produced a DEIS that is excessively narrow and that fails to develop a legitimate range of alternatives and to comprehensively analyze the implications of rebuilding an enlarged freight tunnel at the current Virginia Avenue location.

Response to Comment 20-4

Sections 5.17 and 5.18 were revised in the FEIS to include discussion of the indirect and cumulative effects to passenger rail service, respectively.

Response to Comment 20-5

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project. However, the EIS should and does address relevant freight rail transportation and public impacts of this project. In response to specific remarks in this comment: (1) Although the project is not meant to improve passenger rail service, the improved efficiency of freight rail transportation should benefit passenger service (see Sections 5.15.1 of the FEIS for further information); (2) Section 5.3 was revised for the FEIS to include the long-term safety and security impacts of rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel; (3) The long-term air quality impacts of the project were addressed in Section 5.5 of the DEIS; (4) Rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel does not affect the types of locomotives used by passenger rail service; and (5) Although the project is not meant to improve passenger rail service, it does not preclude other solutions to better to manage rail traffic in and around the District among freight and passenger users.

Most strikingly, CSX has failed to demonstrate how a downstream freight, passenger and commuter rail would be impacted by a rebuilt Virginia Avenue Tunnel. 20-6

An alternative solution to CSX's own capacity problems (and well as to other unacknowledged needs) would be to separate passenger and freight rail to enable both to expand in the future. But in this draft of the EIS, that alternative is not being considered.

We think it needs to be. What is at stake here is whether the continued shared use of the SW tracks and Long Bridge by freight, passenger, and commuter rail threatens to undermine the national and local planning goals articulated in the Federal Workplace Element of the Comprehensive Plan, the Union Station Master Plan, and the SW Ecodistrict Plan. An overarching goal (and premise) of these initiatives is that alternatives to automobility should be promoted in both transportation and land use planning and they all envision substantial increases in both passenger and commuter rail (including through-running MARC trains to Virginia).

We believe that the DEIS, as currently written, fails to provide a useful decision-making tool and that the "no build" option should be adopted until a revised DEIS that develops genuine alternatives and analyzes each in a comprehensive, detailed, and even-handed way has been issued and commented upon.

The Purpose and Need Statement is Unduly Narrow

The proposed rebuilding of the Virginia Avenue tunnel serves only the interests of freight rail. To provide efficient freight rail transportation service the DEIS defines the "needs" to be met as those that are exclusively related to CSX's self-interest. The detrimental impacts of the expansion on passenger and commuter rail are neither acknowledged nor evaluated in the DEIS. Nor are a series of other local and national needs related to the replacement of obsolete rail infrastructure. 20-7

The Importance of Passenger and Commuter Rail is Neither Acknowledged Nor Examined

The proposed solution of rebuilding the Virginia Avenue tunnel will remove a significant freight rail bottleneck, but in so doing *will very likely create a major passenger and commuter rail bottleneck on the SW rail tracks and the Long Bridge*. Expanding the capacity of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel will force passenger and commuter rail to compete with an even greater number of freight trains for use of the SW tracks and the Long Bridge, both of which are owned and controlled by CSX, and both of which are aging pieces of infrastructure. This is a scenario in which freight benefits at the expense of passenger and commuter rail. That outcome is neither desirable nor inevitable if we think ahead and consider a wider range of impacts and options. 20-8

Response to Comment 20-6

Section 5.15 of the DEIS describes how passenger rail and freight coexist in the region. Sections 5.17 and 5.18 were revised in the FEIS to include discussion of the indirect and cumulative effects to passenger rail service, respectively.

Response to Comment 20-7

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project. However, the EIS should and does address relevant freight rail transportation and public impacts of this project. Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. Making the tunnel double stack capable allows twice the amount of intermodal container freight to be carried per train. Additionally, eliminating the single track bottleneck at the Virginia Avenue Tunnel increases the fluidity of both freight and passenger rail service on this portion of the network. In 2013, more than 368,000 carloads of rail freight originated in or was delivered to the District by CSX. As of 2013, CSX provides serves three customers in the District and two just over the District border in Maryland. There are also other properties in the District that connect to CSX's line, and CSX is currently engaged in discussions with two new potential rail customers in the District. There are also efforts by the City Council to preserve existing industrial zoning for properties with rail connections and outreach to promote further economic development in the District. The products received and shipped by these District customers include lumber, scrap metal, recycling materials, transformers, and aggregate.

Response to Comment 20-8

The project eliminates a bottleneck (existing single-track Virginia Avenue Tunnel). It does not create one. Please see Chapter 2 of the FEIS for discussion on why the existing conditions represent a bottleneck, and revised Section 3.7 for more information on the need for eliminating a bottleneck. Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District.

Safety and Security Issues Are Not Addressed

Given that the Virginia Avenue tunnel will soon be obsolete for freight traffic, before investing in expanding it, we should consider whether we actually want to route significantly more freight through the Monumental Core, especially when Washington, DC is neither the point of origin for that freight nor its destination. Serious safety and security risks of freight moving through the nation's capital in close proximity to the Capitol, the Mall and numerous federal offices are not considered in the DEIS. The potential for terrorism and sabotage is not examined in the DEIS, nor is there any reference to the Transportation Security Administration's *National Strategy for Rail Transportation Security*. The tracks in Southwest Washington contain several changes from double to triple to single track operation involving switches and curves that increase the danger of derailment, particularly as the tracks become more congested with the proposed doubling of commuter and passenger rail operations and freight operations. With certain types of cargo, such as a derailment would result in tragic loss of life, and unimaginable damage to our government, its institutions and memorials.

20-9

The Impact on Air Quality is Not Considered

The shared use of freight rail infrastructure means that, because of CSX restrictions, commuter and passenger trains will not be able to use currently available and unused electric locomotives that would provide significant air quality benefits.

By limiting the environmental impacts to the relatively small reconstruction area and the time frame of the reconstruction activity, the DEIS does not consider the impact on other rail operations or the emissions that CSX will produce after reconstruction of the tunnel. Airborne emissions affecting air quality will increase as the rebuilt tunnel accommodates the increase in the number of freight trains, and probably an even greater increase in the number of locomotives because the heavier double-stacked container trains will likely require double-locomotives. Nowhere does the DEIS quantify this increase in emissions or its impact on air quality.

20-10

Impacts on air quality should be included in the DEIS and CSX should be required to compute the projected level of those emissions. Such analysis is necessary to evaluate the need to reroute CSX diesel trains to reduce the level of contaminants in the downtown and in the Monumental Core areas as well as to project the level of environmental mitigation if the SW tracks were electrified.

Alternative Routing is Not Adequately Considered

The DEIS confines its consideration of the alternatives to routing freight through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, the heavily used SW tracks and Long Bridge to the routes NCPD examined in its 2007 *Freight Railroad Realignment Feasibility Study* and simply rejects those routes. The DEIS does not explore any other pragmatic alternatives such as a Potomac River crossing from

20-11

Response to Comment 20-9

The CSX rail route in the District from the Long Bridge to the Anacostia Bridge is a secure corridor that is managed and monitored by CSX in conjunction with the United States Department of Homeland Security. If the tunnel is rebuilt the modern infrastructure and new technologies that will be applied inside the tunnel, including a state of the art roadbed, will provide a greater level of safety than the existing tunnel or Alternative 1. The safe transportation of hazardous materials is regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The Transportation Security Administration determines the routes for shipment of certain hazardous materials. CSX does not transport explosive, toxic by inhalation (TIH), or poisonous by inhalation (PIH) materials through the District. The composition of freight passing through the District will not change as a result of this project. For security reasons CSX does not publicly disclose information about the materials it transports. However, CSX regularly provides a list of the top 25 hazardous materials (by rail car count) shipped through the District to the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), the District Fire & EMS and Police Departments, as well as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. CSX delivered an updated list to these agencies on December 5, 2013. Safety procedures relative to railroad operations at construction sites, for all Class I railroads such as CSX, fall under the purview of the FRA. In accordance with the FRA's safety regulations, there are formal rules with specific protocols that railroads are required to follow to ensure the safety of trains moving through construction sites, the safety of workers involved, and the safety of the general public. If the tunnel is reconstructed the project site will be under 24/7 surveillance and the construction area will be kept secured from outside intrusion, while still maintaining north-south access for motorists, cyclists and pedestrians. CSX has established a community office near the project at New Jersey Avenue and added three additional police officers to patrol the proposed construction site. This adds additional security for the community as well as the ability for real-time information and on-site coordination of emergency officials. All railroad workers, including CSX employees and its contractors that work on or near railroad tracks, are required to be formally trained and undergo what is called "Roadway Worker Protection Training" per FRA statutory requirements. In addition, each roadway worker is required to undergo security training. All railroad contractors undergo a criminal background check every two years under the requirements of the industry's e-RAILSAFE program. CSX regularly meets with District first responders regarding freight rail transportation issues including: response procedures, coordination and communications during incident response, and training. CSX has supported and will continue to support rail incident training for District first responders. District of Columbia emergency responders regularly participate in specialized safety training provided by CSX for emergency planning assistance and response. In 2010, more than 220 D.C. Fire & EMS personnel participated in hands-on training on how to respond to a railroad incident at CSX's Benning Rail Yard. In addition CSX and District emergency responders participate in table-top drills, crisis management exercises and other coursework designed to meet the needs of the District Fire & EMS. Since 2007, CSX has sponsored training for thirteen D.C. Fire & EMS hazmat team members to attend a week-long training session at the Association of American Railroads Security and Emergency Response Training Center in Pueblo, Colorado. If the project moves forward, the District Department of Transportation will approve all maintenance of traffic plans. This will ensure that appropriate emergency access is maintained in and around the project site during the project. Additionally, a collaborative Emergency Action Plan (EAP) will be developed by the CSX project team, the CSX Public Safety department, and D.C. Fire & EMS. The plan will outline specific incident responses based on best-practice responses to situations and hazards common to construction and to the general area. The EAP will be reviewed periodically and will be updated as needed as the project progresses. The EAP will include step-by-step specific procedures to deal with emergency situations during construction.

Safety and Security Issues Are Not Addressed

Given that the Virginia Avenue tunnel will soon be obsolete for freight traffic, before investing in expanding it, we should consider whether we actually want to route significantly more freight through the Monumental Core, especially when Washington, DC is neither the point of origin for that freight nor its destination. Serious safety and security risks of freight moving through the nation's capital in close proximity to the Capitol, the Mall and numerous federal offices are not considered in the DEIS. The potential for terrorism and sabotage is not examined in the DEIS, nor is there any reference to the Transportation Security Administration's *National Strategy for Rail Transportation Security*. The tracks in Southwest Washington contain several changes from double to triple to single track operation involving switches and curves that increase the danger of derailment, particularly as the tracks become more congested with the proposed doubling of commuter and passenger rail operations and freight operations. With certain types of cargo, such a derailment would result in tragic loss of life, and unimaginable damage to our government, its institutions and memorials.

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20-10

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20-11

Response to Comment 20-10

Electrification of CSX's mainline is not a part of this project. General [transportation] conformity was followed as defined by USEPA. The air quality modeling presented in the DEIS uses the appropriate USEPA modeling methodology, as described in the tech report included as an appendix to this document. It properly reflects the projected air quality impacts of this construction project.

Response to Comment 20-11

This proposal is not a reasonable alternative because it presents a number of infirmities including the rerouting of a major railroad from an existing longstanding right-of-way through a new structure over the Potomac River and then using another right-of-way that is of critical importance to the DC government for other purposes. Section 3.2 of the DEIS identified all the alternatives considered, including concepts that would temporarily or permanently reroute the mainline freight rail network outside of the District, and provided the reasons why none of the reroute concepts were selected for further consideration. Refer to Chapter 3 for details on the alternatives screening process.

Virginia to Anacostia (using a bridge or a tunnel), using the ROW that formerly supplied chemicals to Blue Plains, discussed more fully in Section 5. This is but one example of alternative routing that the DEIS needs to evaluate in order to separate freight from passenger and commuter rail operation. 20-11

Logical Termini Were Not Chosen

By biasing the Purpose and Needs statement to favor rebuilding the existing tunnel, and then limiting the evaluation of environmental effects to the area and time-frame of the construction activity, the DEIS fails to consider the adverse effects of the continued use of the tunnel on other parts of that alignment, including the Anacostia River Bridge and its adverse effects on boating access to the river, allowing the Anacostia channel to be dredged further upstream to facilitate greater boating use, improving neighborhood access to the river, and the fact that Anacostia Park will continue to be divided by the approach tracks to that bridge. The failure to select logical termini has also contributed to the arbitrary limitation of alternatives under consideration and a failure to recognize the systemic effects that rebuilding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel would have on parties other than CSX. 20-12

The Section 4(f) Evaluation is Flawed

The Evaluation concedes that the temporary “use” of Virginia Avenue, a contributing element to the L’Enfant Plan, which is listed in the National Register and thus a historic site of national significance, during reconstruction and enlargement of the tunnel will not be *de minimis*, would not be minor and the use would be adverse in terms of the National Historic Preservation Act Section 106. The Evaluation fails to address the permanent use of a significant part of Virginia Avenue, because of the proposed enlargement of the tunnel beyond its present dimensions. The Evaluation did not consider the full range of feasible and prudent alternatives that would avoid “use” of Virginia Avenue. The evaluation of the alternatives that were considered in the Evaluation used the wrong standard: the biased Purpose and Needs statement that permeates the entire DEIS. 20-13

Conclusion

There is a whole segment of our rail infrastructure that is obsolete and problematic for a variety of reasons. CSX wants to fix the one piece that affects only their business, and to do so in a way that (a) is likely to commit us to decades of continued reliance on a route that should be retired and (b) not only fails to solve but actually exacerbates a number of existing problems (safety/security, disruption to urban fabric and parklands, air quality, constraints of passenger/commuter rail, navigability of the Anacostia). Everybody agrees that the Virginia Avenue Tunnel is obsolete, so why are the only two alternatives this DEIS is considering (1) wait until the tunnel starts falling apart and then rebuild it on a much larger scale in approximately the same place and (2) rebuild it now on a much larger scale in approximately the

Response to Comment 20-12

Chapter 2 of the FEIS was revised to include discussion regarding the independent utility and logical termini of the project.

Response to Comment 20-13

As described in Section 5.11 of the DEIS, the adverse effect to the L’Enfant Plan of the City of Washington, DC would only occur during construction. The Section 4(f) evaluation considered all the concepts identified in Section 3.2, which included reroute concepts. Also, please see response to Comment 20-5.

same place? For a host of reasons, re-routing freight traffic has to be considered and considered objectively in terms of the potential costs and benefits associated with replacing our obsolete rail infrastructure.

No response required for this section of comment

Analysis of Purpose and Need Statement

CSX's Proposed Purpose and Need Statement Biases the DEIS

The proposed rebuilding of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel serves only the interests of freight rail. The detrimental impacts of the expansion on passenger and commuter rail are neither acknowledged nor evaluated in the DEIS.

The Purpose and Need Statement (DEIS S.3) states: "The purpose of the proposed action is to preserve, over the long-term, the continued ability to provide efficient freight transportation services in the District of Columbia, the Washington Metropolitan Area and the eastern seaboard."

To accomplish that purpose, the DEIS states that it will be necessary to meet three needs. However, some of these "needs" could be met in alternative ways and some of these "needs" fail to consider facts beyond the narrow self-interest of CSX:

Need #1. *Address the structural and operational deficiencies of the century-old Virginia Avenue Tunnel.* This is a misleading framing of the issue. The current desire to rebuild the tunnel is based exclusively on capacity constraints (in light of anticipated increases in demand) rather than any concern about the tunnel's structural integrity. The DEIS implicitly acknowledges this fact when it claims that "a major structural deficiency could materialize over the next few decades, possibly due to the continued aging of the tunnel's masonry structure." (DEIS 2.1.3) This is conjecture. The DEIS notes the now-obsolete construction methods used to build the tunnel, but states that the "overall structure [of the tunnel] is in relatively good shape" (*id.*). Yes, the tunnel is old and it has drainage problems, but the DEIS specifically disclaims any near-term danger of collapse stating "the tunnel is in no danger of collapsing in part due to tunnel reinforcements and reconstruction made in late 1985 and early 1986." (*id.*).

Operational deficiencies are due to the inability of the tunnel to accommodate two-way traffic of double stacked intermodal containers in the existing one-way tunnel. The DEIS pre-empts the question of whether the deficiency should be addressed by finding an alternative to sending freight traffic through the tunnel rather than by reconstructing the tunnel.

Need #2. *Accommodate expected increases in freight transportation that, in part, would stem from the Panama Canal expansion scheduled for 2015.* This statement unreasonably limits the DEIS to the expected increases in freight transportation instead of encompassing expected increases in rail traffic generally, including passenger and commuter operations; the impact of CSX increases on their operations; the impacts of all of these increases on air quality, safety and security; and the potential to address these issues through different rerouting alignments. In addition, the estimates for construction, ranging between 30 and 66 months, put the completion

20-14

20-15

20-16

20-17

20-18

Response to Comment 20-14

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Section 5.15 of the DEIS describes how passenger rail and freight coexist in the region. Sections 5.17 and 5.18 were revised in the FEIS to include discussion of the indirect and cumulative effects to passenger rail service, respectively.

Response to Comment 20-15

The physical conditions of the tunnel described in Section 2.1.3 of the DEIS were based on information obtained through engineering inspections. The fact that the tunnel is showing evidence of "distress" and yet the "overall structure [of the tunnel] is in relatively good shape" are not inconsistent. The evidence of distress is early indicators that the tunnel needs to be replaced. The evidence does not suggest there is an immediate danger that any section of tunnel would collapse. Adopting Alternative 1 will result in an increased risk of structural failure over time. A new modern tunnel will have a lower risk of structural failure. Moreover, the transportation industry in the US is engaged in comprehensive infrastructure improvement to meet 21st century demands and to promote the nation's economy; this project is just one of many.

Response to Comment 20-16

Section 2.1.3 of the DEIS reports two facts about the existing tunnel: (1) it contains just one set of tracks, with two sets of tracks immediately outside the portals; and (2) it does not have adequate vertical clearance to allow double-stack container operations, which is the industry standard.

Response to Comment 20-17

Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. The purpose and need section of an EIS does not consider the impacts. Please refer to revised Sections 5.17 and 5.18 in the FEIS for discussion of the indirect and cumulative effects to passenger rail service, respectively.

Response to Comment 20-18

The transportation demand need described in the DEIS is a long-term need, based on the freight growth expected from the opening of the Panama Canal.

date of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel between 2016 and 2019 (DEIS, pp. 3-53). These dates do not include local and federal review and permitting time, of which the EIS process is one part. Adding the projected review and approval time to the various construction schedules, it will be some years before the Virginia Avenue Tunnel “catches up” to the potential increases in freight rail generated by the Panama Canal expansion.

20-18

Need #3. Ensure that during construction freight transportation services remain uninterrupted while the functions of the tunnel are being replaced with a new facility.

This is basically a restatement of the second need and goes to CSX’s anticipated expansion. Existing freight transportation services would remain uninterrupted if nothing were to be done and the level of freight transportation did not increase. Even if freight transportation were to increase, CSX has alternate routings, some of which it claims to be using now for hazardous cargo that could accommodate increases in freight transportation.

20-19

The DEIS’s Statement of Purpose and Need Should be Revised

The Statement of Purpose and Need needs to be revisited and to incorporate needs and purposes beyond the narrow interests of CSX. Additional purposes and needs worth considering include:

- ♥ Accommodate the expansion of passenger and commuter rail capacity.
- ♥ Contribute to a coordinated solution of the problems created by outmoded infrastructure – including but not limited to the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, the Long Bridge, shared tracks in SW DC, the Anacostia River Rail Bridge – rather than simply relocate chokepoints.
- ♥ Mitigate safety and security concerns related to the proximity of the current freight rail system to the Monumental Core of Washington, DC and the U.S. Capitol.
- ♥ Minimize the impact of increasing rail traffic on air quality – e.g. facilitate electrification and enable mode shifts from driving to passenger/commuter rail as well as from trucking to freight rail.
- ♥ Be consistent with other local and national planning initiatives to redevelop and repair the urban fabric in this area.
- ♥ Respect and, where possible, repair parks and natural resources by eliminating, for example, existing impediments to navigability and public access to the Anacostia River.

20-20

Response to Comment 20-19

This is not a restatement of the second need. The second need is long term or post-construction, while the third is a construction-period need.

Response to Comment 20-20

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project. However, the EIS should and does address relevant freight rail transportation and public impacts of this project. In response to specific remarks in this comment: (1) Although the project is not meant to improve passenger rail service, the improved efficiency of freight rail transportation should benefit passenger service (see Sections 5.15.1 of the FEIS for further information); (2) Section 5.5 was revised for the FEIS to include the long-term safety and security impacts of rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel; (3) The long-term air quality impacts of the project were addressed in Section 5.5 of the DEIS; (4) Rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel does not affect the types of locomotives used by passenger rail service; and (5) Although the project is not meant to improve passenger rail service, it does not preclude other solutions to better to manage rail traffic in and around the District among freight and passenger users.

The rehabilitation of Virginia Avenue Park will be conducted immediately after construction of the new tunnel. This work is part of the overall project. The planning process to determine post-construction amenities in Virginia Avenue Park will be controlled by the DC Department of Parks and Recreation. The project team will work with DPR to ensure that the park is properly restored and meets the requirements of DPR. CSX, DDOT and FHWA will work together to determine the streetscape of the restored Virginia Avenue SE, and will coordinate with the community during this process. This will also include the post-construction condition of the area under I-695 at 2nd Street SE. Revised Section 3.6 of the FEIS includes a description of the conceptual design of the post-construction streetscape of Virginia Avenue SE. Details of this plan will be subject to community and stakeholder input, and agency reviews.

Logical Termini Should be Chosen

Because the Virginia Avenue Tunnel is a small piece of a larger section of aging rail structure that imposes capacity constraints, it is important to establish logical termini to ensure that proposed alternatives actually eliminate rather than relocate chokepoints. At a minimum, we would suggest that the analysis encompass shared rail infrastructure including Long Bridge, the Southwest tracks, as well as the Union Station and the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Another possibility would be to define the termini to encompass both the Potomac and the Anacostia River rail crossings.

20-21

Response to Comment 20-21

Chapter 2 of the FEIS was revised to include discussion regarding the independent utility and logical termini of the project.

Separation of Freight and Passenger Operations

Expanded commuter and passenger rail service is necessary to provide commuters and travelers with viable alternative to automobile travel. Currently, such expansion is limited by constraints imposed on commuter and passenger rail operations that share CSX-owned tracks with freight rail operations.

20-22

Response to Comment 20-22

The purpose and need of the Project does not involve or include improving passenger rail service for the District.

Why Increasing Commuter Rail is Essential

The Problem: Two-thirds of the cars on DC's streets during rush hour are from out of state and those cars impose increasing demands on parking and pressures on congestion. Of US cities with more than 100,000 residents, DC has the highest daytime percentage increase in population due to commuters, and in terms of absolute numbers of people coming into the city each workday, we're second only to Manhattan.

Our car problem is largely a commuter problem.

Our major challenge is getting large numbers of people in and out of the city efficiently. And this is a problem that will only get bigger in the future. As the Metrorail system reaches capacity and starts to lose riders due to crowded conditions and unreliability, commuter rail has been gaining ridership.³

In terms of the percentage of those commuters using cars, trucks or vans, DC again has the highest percentage at 54%, compared to Manhattan at 13% and Boston at 50%. DC is the lowest in the use of commuter rail: DC 2.8%, Manhattan 11% and Boston 8%. Manhattan has just under three times the number of commuters coming in each day as DC does, but more than 12 times as many traveling by commuter rail.⁴ Our regional transportation priorities must include a serious focus on how to expand passenger rail service into the District through MARC and VRE, as well as Amtrak.⁵

The Approach: *One obvious solution is to separate freight and passenger rail operations in Southwest by building an additional Potomac River rail crossing so the volume and imperatives of freight traffic don't constrain the growth of commuter rail.*

³ Kytja Weir, "Commuter trains attract riders even as numbers flag on Metro," May 29, 2013 <http://washingtonexaminer.com/commuter-trains-attract-riders-even-as-numbers-flag-on-metro/article/2530789>


⁴ US Census Bureau, 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates:

	Total Commuters	Work in Place of Residence	Commute by Car/Truck/Van	Commute by Railroad
District of Columbia	773,735	220,409	420,454	21,523
Manhattan	2,334,100	769,884	321,070	270,690
Boston	555,227	209,100	278,990	44,295

Continued Investment in the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Will Compromise Commuter and Passenger Rail Service

CSX uses the SW tracks to access the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Passenger and commuter trains use those same SW tracks to access Union Station. The rail tracks from Virginia are double-tracked across the Long Bridge, until they reach 12th Street SW where they become triple-tracked, with double-tracks for passenger and commuter trains branching off to the north to Union Station through the First Street Tunnel. At Twelfth Street, double tracks for freight trains continue east until they become a single track entering the Virginia Avenue Tunnel.

These SW tracks provide the **only** means for passenger and commuter trains to access Union Station from the south and for trains originating at Union Station to travel south.



To the extent that rebuilding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel will result in additional CSX trains using the SW tracks, it will limit the expansion of passenger and commuter rail options running south of Union Station. If the number CSX trains increases substantially, reconstruction of the tunnel may even force a decrease in commuter and passenger rail service.

20-23

Response to Comment 20-23

Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. Making the tunnel double stack capable allows twice the amount of intermodal container freight to be carried per train. Additionally, eliminating the single track bottleneck at the Virginia Avenue Tunnel increases the fluidity of both freight and passenger rail service on this portion of the network.

VRE's expansion is already being limited by its agreement with CSX – at this point its rush hour trains are filled to capacity and typically have standees, trains are as long as existing platforms allow, and bi-level cars are in use. Thirty-six of forty slots allocated to VRE are currently in use, which means that only one more round-trip train can be added to each of the two routes that operate along this route.⁶ MARC, too, has seen the expansion of its Brunswick line constrained by CSX.⁷ Both locally and nationally, CSX's leadership has been quite vehement that it will resist any passenger rail proposals that threaten its own bottom line:

CSX Corp. CEO, President and Chairman Michael Ward told Bloomberg News yesterday that he “can’t be part of” President Barack Obama’s push for high speed rail.

Ward said high-speed passenger rail service won’t make enough money and freight rail systems can’t withstand trains moving as fast as 110 mph. Class I railroads have expressed concern over high-speed rail’s impact on their freight rail systems, but Ward’s recent criticism takes a more aggressive stance.

“I’m a corporation. I exist to make money, OK?” Ward said. “You can’t make money hauling passengers, so why would I want to do that? That wouldn’t be fair to my shareholders.”⁸

If we want to expand both freight and commuter/passenger rail capacity, then dedicated tracks, with the level of service optimized for each use, should be provided. Faced with a similar situation in Baltimore, and armed with sufficient funding to study the issue comprehensively, the Federal Railroad Administration concluded that “In the environment of Baltimore’s topography and development patterns, the needs of freight and passenger service differ so greatly as to mandate separate freight and passenger facilities.”⁹

No response required for this section of comment

How Shared Infrastructure Constrains Passenger and Commuter Rail Service

The constraints that restrict increasing commuter and passenger rail because of the shared tracks in SW are considerable:

- A Single River Crossing for All Rail Users. Currently, freight, passenger and commuter trains share the double-tracked Long Bridge, the only Potomac River rail crossing within 70 miles, as well as rail tracks in Southwest (SW). According to the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board, two-thirds of the traffic on the Long Bridge is passenger or commuter rather

⁶Parsons Brinckerhoff, *VRE System Plan Operations Board Workshop Summary Report*, August 2013, pp.2, [http://www.prtc-transit.org/docs/commission/Sep2013/Item_10C_VRE_Info--VRE_System_Plan_Operations_Board_Workshop_Summary_Report_\(08-13\).pdf](http://www.prtc-transit.org/docs/commission/Sep2013/Item_10C_VRE_Info--VRE_System_Plan_Operations_Board_Workshop_Summary_Report_(08-13).pdf)

⁷ Michele Whelley, “MARC: Rolling in the Right Direction,” *The Baltimore Sun*, May 26, 2013; http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-26/news/bs-ed-marc-expansion-20130526_1_marc-penn-line-camden-line-marc-service

⁸ Mark Szakonyi, “CSX CEO Ward rejects high-speed rail,” *Jacksonville Business Journal*, April 7, 2011 http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/blog/trade_trucks_trains/2011/04/csx-ceo-ward-rejects-high-speed-rail.html

⁹Federal Railroad Administration, *Report to Congress: Baltimore’s Railroad Network (2005), Part II: Alternatives*, p. 9-3. <http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L04159>

than freight rail.¹⁰ And the SW tracks reflect this balance – after the Bridge, the route is triple-tracked, with two tracks providing passenger and commuter train with access to Union Station and the third track providing freight trains access to the single-tracked Virginia Avenue Tunnel.

- CSX-Imposed Schedules. The current operating agreement for the Potomac River rail crossing at the Long Bridge precludes any increase in the frequency of VRE commuter trains. In the future, with the increase in freight traffic, the competition for rail crossings will only increase. Unfortunately, CSX has consistently declined to disclose their expected increase in freight traffic and the amount of additional river crossing capacity that is available on the Long Bridge as currently configured.¹¹ In the absence of that data it is reasonable to conclude that the increased traffic on the Long Bridge will be to CSX's benefit and the detriment of passenger and commuter rail.

- CSX-Dictated Motive Power. MARC's Penn Line is electric, the Brunswick and Camden Lines (which operate on CSX tracks) are diesel and VRE is diesel (as required by CSX). Because of the lack of electric catenaries along the CSX-owned SW tracks, Amtrak must change locomotives at Union Station to use diesel to the south and electric to the north, losing time, delaying passengers and prolonging service times. Electrification of the tracks south of Union Station is environmentally desirable for passenger and commuter trains, but opposed by CSX because of possible interference with their planned double-stacked container trains.

No response required for this section of comment

- CSX-Controlled Track and Operations. CSX designs their rail lines for freight loads, not for passenger loads. Freight operations are typically slower and less time-critical than passenger rail. As a result, signaling, scheduling, platforms, speed and logistics generally are optimized for CSX's freight operations.

Can Shared Infrastructure Handle Significant Simultaneous Increases in Both Passenger and Freight Rail Operations?

In 2005, the Federal Railroad Administration estimated that the number of CSX trains traveling between Washington and Baltimore would increase from 33 trains a day in 2012 to a high of 56 trains a day in 2050.¹² In the same time frame, the Union Station Master Plan proposes to triple

¹⁰Karin Foster, Memorandum re 2013 TPB Freight Transportation Highlighted Projects, dated 18 September 2013, p. 12. <http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/committee-documents/al1aXFZf20130912133457.pdf>

¹¹According to the FHWA, this is precisely the sort of data that NEPA analysis requires: “[r]ather than simply stating that additional capacity is needed between two points, information on the adequacy of current facilities to handle the present and projected traffic (e.g. What capacity is needed and the level of service for the existing and proposed facilities) should be discussed.” *NEPA and Transportation Decisionmaking: The Importance of Purpose and Need in Environmental Documents*, <http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/tdmneed.asp>

¹² This projection did not take into account the increased freight traffic that would result from expansion of the Panama Canal. So 56 CSX trains a day is a conservative estimate of future freight demand. *Report to Congress: Baltimore's Railroad Network*, p. 4-13.

the number of passengers and double the number of passenger and commuter trains¹³ and the SW Ecodistrict Plan proposes through-running MARC trains to Virginia and increasing the number of commuter trains using L'Enfant Station.¹⁴ The combined pressure of increased freight and passenger/commuter rail demand seems likely to overwhelm the carrying capacity of the Long Bridge and the SW rail tracks. Since those facilities are owned by CSX, it is likely that CSX will resolve that competition in its own favor and thereby frustrate the proposed increases in Amtrak, VRE, and MARC service.

20-24

Why the EIS Should Consider the Implications for Passenger and Freight Rail, as well as Freight Rail in its Analysis of Whether the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Should be Reconstructed

The current balance between freight and passenger/commuter rail operations on the CSX-owned shared-use infrastructure south of Union Station is an artifact, in part, of the limitations on freight rail capacity imposed by the current configuration of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Even with that constraint on freight volume in place, VRE's access to this infrastructure is already being rationed. Quadrupling the capacity of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, without coordinated increases in the capacity of the Long Bridge and the SW tracks creates the very real possibility that CSX will satisfy its own needs for increased rail capacity at the expense of other rail users.

20-25

This is why it is important to revise the DEIS to include a more comprehensive statement of needs, a broader range of alternatives, a larger segment of rail infrastructure, and more detailed and relevant data. Looking solely at the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, exclusively from the perspective of freight rail, turns the NEPA process into a pointless exercise rather than a useful decisionmaking tool.

Response to Comment 20-24

CSX will continue to work with AMTRAK, VRE and MARC to accommodate passenger operations on the CSX network. The purpose and need of the Project does not involve or include improving passenger rail service for the District. Although delays do not currently occur due to available time for scheduling windows for passenger service, Virginia Avenue Tunnel is a bottleneck and inhibits the flow of train traffic. Future growth is likely to cause these windows to shrink and create potential conflicts. The reconstruction of this tunnel, particularly with two tracks, will provide additional capacity for freight movements.

Response to Comment 20-25

Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. Making the tunnel double stack capable allows twice the amount of intermodal container freight to be carried per train. Additionally, eliminating the single track bottleneck at the Virginia Avenue Tunnel increases the fluidity of both freight and passenger rail service on this portion of the network.

¹³ *Union Station Master Plan*, Washington, DC (July 25, 2012), Executive Summary, page 2.

¹⁴ The recently adopted *Southwest Ecodistrict Plan* proposes transportation strategies to revitalize and reconnect the community that will "build on existing road, rail and bus infrastructure to enhance transportation capacity . . . and better connect all modes of travel." (Page 13) The SWE Plan builds on the District's Maryland Avenue SW Small Area Plan through an expanded L'Enfant commuter rail station that will serve VRE, MARC, and Amtrak commuters.

Safety and Security Issues

The DEIS fails to address two serious safety and security considerations from increased rail freight in close proximity to the US Capitol, the Mall and numerous federal offices.

A Train Derailment, or an Accidental Spill Could Lead to a Catastrophic Event | 20-26

CSX is required to select the “safest and most secure routes” for its most dangerous cargos, generally defined as substances posing a poison or toxic inhalation hazard, explosives, and radioactive materials (49 CFR Parts 171-180) and providing alternate routes for hazardous materials. However, CSX unilaterally makes the decision about what material should be rerouted and applies its own weighting to the federal designated “routing factors” that include security, safety and economics. The decision is made without public disclosure.¹⁵ Nor does the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have authority to approve the railroad routing decisions or to override them. FRA’s oversight of the freight routing decisions is merely to evaluate the railroad’s routing choices after they have been implemented.

CSX’s unilateral decision-making presents the possibility of human error in identifying, classifying or handling materials that are dangerous or hazardous. As we will see below, all of these errors can result in great harm. CSX has provided assurances that the most dangerous substances are not routed on the SW tracks and through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel; however, there are several types of less dangerous or potentially dangerous cargo that CSX has determined do not require rerouting, including denatured alcohol, terephthalic acid, fluorolytic acid and sodium chlorate. These, and other materials may be transported through Washington. The possible occurrence of human error together with outmoded running stock, including the DOT-111 tank car creates a volatile mix that has resulted in disastrous damage in recent derailments in other locations as close as the city of Baltimore.

Let us consider several recent derailments and their consequences:

The Lac-Maginet Derailment: On July 6, 2013 a petroleum train derailed in Lac-Maginet, Quebec, resulting in catastrophic explosions and fire that claimed the lives of 47 people and destroyed roughly half of the downtown area.¹⁶ The tank cars carrying the oil were DOT-111

¹⁵ The procedures of Circular No.OT-55-L, December 13, 2010 limit the disclosure of information. Upon written request, AAR members will provide bona fide emergency response agencies or planning groups with specific commodity flow information covering at a minimum the top 25 hazardous commodities transported through the community in rank order. The request must be made using the form included as Appendix F by an official emergency response or planning group with a cover letter on appropriate letterhead bearing an authorized signature. **The form reflects the fact that the railroad industry considers this information to be restricted information of a security sensitive nature and that the recipient of the information must agree to release the information only to bona fide emergency response planning and response organizations and not distribute the information publicly in whole or in part without the individual railroad’s express written permission.** [Emphasis added]

¹⁶ Petroleum spills from tank cars are not uncommon. An analysis of U.S. Transportation Department data found less than one incident of oil spills involving pipelines per billion ton-miles, compared with 19.95 incidents per billion ton-miles for trains.

Response to Comment 20-26

Please see response to Comment 20-9.

cars, known for their tendency to split open during derailments.¹⁷ It should be noted that approximately 70% of the US tank car fleet is composed of DOT-111 tank cars. Such a split occurred in Lac-Maginet causing five of the tank cars to explode, setting off massive explosions and fires fueled by the contents of other rail cars.

The Cherry Valley Derailment: On June 19, 2009 a Canadian National Railway train carrying denatured alcohol derailed at a grade crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. Of the 19 DOT-111 tank cars that derailed, 13 of them ruptured and caught fire. The resulting fire engulfed several motor vehicles stopped at the crossing, resulting in personal injuries, including one fatality, a mandatory evacuation within a half-mile radius and property damages estimated at \$7.9 million dollars. The NTSB noted the history of rupture problem with the DOT-111 tank cars, and described the demonstrated need for extra protection such as heat shields, tank jackets, more robust fittings and other modifications. At the time of the Cherry Valley derailment, the American Association of Railroads (AAR) opposed modification or retrofitting of existing tank cars but has increased the crashworthiness of newly constructed DOT-111 tank cars. The DOT-111 tanks cars, identical to those in the Lac-Maginet derailment,¹⁸ remained in service.

The Cherry Valley Derailment: Pipeline Damage: An additional hazard at the site of the Cherry Valley derailment was a 12-inch diameter underground natural gas transmission pipeline, installed deeper underground than required by industry standards and exceeding federal standards. Although it was 11 feet underground (deeper than required by standards), and protected inside a 16-inch diameter casing, during the derailment a railcar wheel and axle deformed the casing and caused damage to the pipe. The NTSB concluded that if the pipeline had been installed with minimum cover, it would have been ruptured as a result of being struck by the derailed equipment, and contributed high-pressure natural gas to the fire. The NTSB explained that while data is not collected about the number of incidents in which pipelines are damaged by train derailments, this and other derailments illustrate that pipelines can and have been damaged when present near railroad accident scenes.¹⁹ The inherent dangers posed by the rupture of several gas lines in the vicinity of the proposed Virginia Avenue Tunnel reconstruction (DEIS, pp. 5-56) in the dense urban environment of Washington DC is unacknowledged and unaccounted for in the DEIS. Nowhere in the EIS is there any description of the gas, electric and other utility lines that presently exist under the SW tracks or the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. The DEIS needs to list all such lines, the nature

No response required for this section of comment

While pipelines spill more oil in absolute numbers because of the nation's vast pipeline network -- an average of 6.6 million gallons of petroleum products were released accidentally from pipelines each year from 2005 to 2009-- during the same period road transportation spilled an average 477,600 gallons a year and trains spilled 83,800 gallons.
<http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/07/15/canada-train-disaster-could-inspire-new-us-regulations/>

¹⁷ <http://www.pressherald.com/news/Obama-administration-delays-oil-train-safety-rules.html?pagenum=full>

¹⁸ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation, March 2, 2012. Pages 1-9 (copy attached).

¹⁹ *Id.*, pp. 9-10.

and extent of the productive conduit in which they are encased and the depth they are located below the tracks.

The Cherry Valley Derailment: Identifying Hazardous Cargo: The Cherry Hill derailment also underscores the high cost of human errors in correctly identifying hazardous materials. Train operators are required to have a “train consist” that accurately identifies the hazardous or dangerous cargo and the position of the rail cars containing hazardous cargo. The train consist for the Cherry Valley train had only 3 of the 76 cars in their proper position.²⁰ The NTSB report did not address the error rates for CSX or other train operators, but it clearly demonstrates that human error can and does occur in administering the Hazardous Materials Regulation.

The Rosedale Derailment: On May 26, 2013 a CSX train (traveling from Selkirk, NY to Waycross, GA, along CSX’s Eastern Seaboard Freight Rail Corridor that includes the Virginia Avenue Tunnel) carrying sodium chlorate, terephthalic acid and a partially empty tank car containing fluorolytic acid derailed in Rosedale, Maryland, a Baltimore suburb. This derailment resulted in a fire and explosions that were felt and heard across Baltimore. Billowing smoke could be seen for hours and resulted in road closures.²¹ Fortunately, damage was limited because the derailment occurred in a rail yard. However, the event underscores the dangers of certain materials that, evaluated individually, CSX apparently considered to be safe enough to transport though densely populated areas. Yet when these materials interacted, they created an explosion of the sodium chlorate that in turn ignited the terephthalic acid that fueled the long burning fire.²²

Terrorism Remains a Threat | 20-27

The Transportation Security Administration has recognized that a terrorist attack on freight rail could have a devastating impact on the nation’s economy. Such an attack could cause a tragic loss of life and have a catastrophic impact on the operation of the American government as well.²³ Unfortunately, the DEIS does not assess the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Response to Comment 20-27

Please see response to Comment 20-9.

²⁰ *Id.*, p. 10

²¹ <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/28/train-derails-in-maryland-explosion-reported/2366957/>.

²² <http://www.cnn.com/news/article/csx-md-train-explosion-caused-chemical-cargo>

²³ TSA has developed a national strategy for rail transportation security outlined below:

Goal 1: Prevent and deter acts of terrorism using, or against, the transportation system.

Terrorists may use attacks to directly disrupt the freight rail transportation system or use the cargo transported by a railroad to carry out larger attacks against the American people. The Sector aims to prevent and deter terrorist attacks before they happen without disrupting the free flow of commerce or compromising civil liberties.

Goal 2: Enhance the all-hazard preparedness and resilience of the global transportation system to safeguard U.S. national interests.

The resilience of the freight rail sector can be improved by increasing its ability to accommodate and absorb damage from natural disasters or terrorist attacks without catastrophic failure. Resilience-improving strategies include a wide variety of mitigation activities, including support of response and recovery activities.

The DEIS must address how rebuilding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel and the associated increase in the volume of freight traffic contribute to increased national security threats, both from sabotage of trains and from explosives in container cars or concealed cargo like the Cuban anti-aircraft missiles hidden in intermodal containers in a North Korean vessel going through the Panama Canal. Worst-case scenarios should be an important, if not decisive, component of the DEIS analysis.

Conclusion

Future congestion on the SW rail tracks, and the greater speed that will be allowed in an enlarged tunnel,²⁴ increase the risk of derailment. In addition, double-stacked container trains increase both the odds that a critical mass of harmful material will occur more frequently and the potential magnitude of damage. Lessons from other derailments underscore the real-world risks of fatalities, massive fires, explosions or other catastrophic events. There are the separate and real possibilities of acts of terrorism and sabotage that could result in a tragic loss of life and have a catastrophic impact on the operation of the American government as well.

All of these considerations lead to the conclusion that these most important topics for the health, life and safety of residents, visitors and workers in metropolitan DC have been inadequately considered in the DEIS.

20-28

Response to Comment 20-28

The operation of double-stack intermodal container freight trains would not decrease the level of safety and security within the new tunnel. Please see response to Comment 20-9.

Goal 3: Improve the effective use of resources for transportation security.

²⁴ Currently the speed in the tunnel is limited to 15 mph, but outside the tunnel (and presumably after reconstruction) the speed is 40 mph (DEIS p. 2.5).

Air Quality

Diesel train operations have a negative and measurable effect on air quality. And an increase in the volume of rail freight being transported through the District of Columbia will lead to an increase in emissions and degradation of air quality. 20-29

The DEIS fails to include any calculations regarding such long-term impacts.

There is no reason to assume that the volume of freight entering Washington, DC would be the same regardless of whether the Virginia Avenue Tunnel is rebuilt. While CSX has failed to provide any data regarding anticipated increases in freight volume,²⁵ it is proposing to quadruple the volume of freight that can travel through the District by rail. CSX has not provided any data indicating what percentage of this traffic either originates from or has a final destination in the Metropolitan Washington area. This omission subverts the NEPA process which is designed to gather the information necessary to make an objective assessment of the relative costs and benefits of a variety of approaches to solving a problem. 20-30

In point of fact, the impetus behind the National Gateway Project (under which the proposed tunnel rebuilding falls) is to create improved connections between East Coast ports and Midwestern markets on CSX-controlled routes – i.e. to improve and upgrade the freight carrying capacity on CSX lines. The vast majority of this freight will be “through traffic” – which should raise the question of whether it is desirable to route significantly more freight through Washington DC’s Monumental Core and densely-populated neighborhoods along capacity-constrained infrastructure that is shared with highly successful passenger and commuter rail services.

And it is disingenuous to suggest (or assume) that trucking is the only alternative. Norfolk Southern operates freight rail services that connect the same markets without sending cargo through Washington, DC or along the congested Northeast Corridor. [See the route map on the page following.] And CSX itself ships hazardous materials using an alternative route. 20-31

Moreover, continued reliance on an expanded Virginia Avenue Tunnel degrades local air quality both by constraining the expansion of popular commuter rail services in a growing economy and by preventing electrification of intercity passenger and commuter rail to and from points south of

Response to Comment 20-29

As described in Section 5.5 of the DEIS, operational emission levels were predicted to be below U.S. Environmental Protection Agency General Conformity de minimis thresholds, and the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The commenter fails to distinguish between the volume of rail freight being transported and the number of trains that it takes to transport that freight. This project is intended to allow the railroad to more efficiently handle the growing volume of freight that is expected whether or not the tunnel is improved.

Response to Comment 20-30

As described in Section 5.15.1 of the DEIS, the FHWA estimated that total U.S. freight shipments would grow by 50 percent over the next 30 years. A large percentage of this growth will be accommodated by freight rail. Within the corridor, freight transportation demand will increase regardless of the project. Passenger service does not currently operate through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, but any of the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth more efficiently, which will benefit passenger service through enhance network fluidity using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District, and eliminate emissions associated with stopping and starting to pass through the single tracked tunnel and reducing potential emissions with double stack technology. In 2013, more than 368,000 carloads of rail freight originated in or was delivered to the District by CSX. As of 2013, CSX provides serves three customers in the District and two just over the District border in Maryland. There are also other properties in the District that connect to CSX’s line, and CSX is currently engaged in discussions with two new potential rail customers in the District. There are also efforts by the City Council to preserve existing industrial zoning for properties with rail connections and outreach to promote further economic development in the District. The products received and shipped by these District customers include lumber, scrap metal, recycling materials, transformers, and aggregate.

Response to Comment 20-31

Section 3.2 of the DEIS addressed the possibility of rerouting freight rail traffic outside of Washington, DC.

²⁵ As FHWA states in *NEPA and Transportation Decisionmaking: The Importance of Purpose and Need in Environmental Document*, “[R]ather than simply stating that additional capacity is needed between two points, information on the adequacy of current facilities to handle the present and projected traffic (e.g. what capacity is needed and the level of service for the existing and proposed facilities) should be discussed” and then explicitly concludes that “It is not sufficient to state that the project is needed to provide increased capacity and improve safety. Supporting data must be provided.”

THE MIDWEST CONNECTION

CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp.'s initiatives to improve connections from East Coast ports to the Midwest will make the ports more attractive to shippers than their West Coast competitors.



http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2009/10/19/story8.html?s=image_gallery

Washington, DC. From an environmental perspective, getting freight out of trucks and onto trains in a way that keeps commuters in cars and off of trains could be a Pyrrhic victory, even if it enhances CSX's bottom line. Similarly, while the DEIS recognizes diesel rail's environmental superiority to trucking, it also needs to acknowledge that electric rail would be preferable to diesel and that the expansion of diesel traffic on CSX-owned and controlled shared rail infrastructure prevents electrification of these tracks for other users.

20-32

Quantifying Airborne Emissions

The DEIS takes an arbitrarily narrow view of the impacts of rebuilding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel by limiting the analysis only to impacts that may occur during construction of the tunnel. The appropriate time frame should encompass the expansion of the Panama Canal, the planned Union Station expansion and implementation of the SW Ecodistrict Plan. Neither the Union Station Master Plan for expansion, nor the SW Ecodistrict Plan, is even acknowledged in the DEIS.

20-33

Response to Comment 20-32

Electrification of CSX's mainline is not a part of this project. General [transportation] conformity was followed as defined by USEPA. The air quality modeling presented in the DEIS uses the appropriate USEPA modeling methodology, as described in the tech report included as an appendix to this document. It properly reflects the projected air quality impacts of this construction project. Rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel will not constrain passenger rail service.

Response to Comment 20-33

The scope of the EIS is appropriate since the proposed action involves replacing infrastructure and any significant adverse impacts are likely to occur during construction, as evident throughout the DEIS. Nevertheless, the project will not affect implementation of the Union Station Master Plan and Southwest Ecodistrict Plan.

CSX Rail Operations are Likely to More Than Double

CXS is currently running 20-30 trains over the SW tracks and through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel (DEIS, p.2-7). CSX has not provided long term projections of the number of trains that CSX will likely operate after the tunnel is rebuilt and after CSX begins to carry the increased freight that will result from the Panama Canal expansion, other than the general statement (DEIS p. 2-5):

According to the FHWA's 2011 Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) forecasts, overall freight tonnage would increase by 50 percent in 2040 from 2010 levels.

This is not a projection of the increased freight that CSX will carry. With the Panama Canal expansion, and the fact that initially only the New York/Newark, Baltimore, and Newport News ports will be able to accommodate those larger container ships, a substantial part of the increased freight will travel over the CSX tracks. (DEIS p.2-6):

As the largest freight railroad company on the east coast, CSX is anticipating the impact of the expanded Panama Canal on freight transportation demand from east coast ports, and is anticipating the need to carry a greater amount of freight between east-coast ports and Midwest markets.

But CSX does not quantify that increase on "freight transportation demand" and has elected not to provide information about the number of CSX trains that are projected over the SW tracks and through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel after the Panama Canal expansion is completed²⁶ when the number of CSX trains is likely to exceed 56 a day.²⁷ The estimate of 56 trains is based on CSX's 2005 growth prediction, without considering the Panama Canal expansion. It is an understatement of what will probably happen after CSX begins carrying increased freight when the larger container ships begin arriving at Newport News, Baltimore and Newark/New York beginning in 2015. But, that freight increase, being supplied by ships delivering intermodal

20-34

Response to Comment 20-34

As described in Section 5.15.1 of the DEIS, the FHWA estimated that total U.S. freight shipments would grow by 50 percent over the next 30 years. A large percentage of this growth will be accommodated by freight rail. Within the corridor, freight transportation demand will increase regardless of the project. Any of the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth more efficiently, which will benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. Passenger service does not currently operate through the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. The Union Station Master Plan and the SW Ecodistrict Plan are not relevant to the project.

²⁶ Submitted May 21, 2012 On Behalf of the Committee of 100 and available on the Virginia Avenue Tunnel website (<http://www.virginiaavenuetunnel.com/public-involvement/>):

Requests For Information

1. What is the projected number of trains that will traverse the tunnel each day (north/south) after the tunnel is completed? Five years after completion?
2. What is the amount of fuel consumed to cross from the Potomac to the Anacostia for an average freight train?
3. What is the average emissions of the CSX locomotive fleet to pull an average freight train in terms of units of NOx and particulates and other emissions expressed per unit of fuel and per mile at the speeds the trains will traverse the tunnel after it is rebuilt?

Response:

CSX: CSX is not allowed to respond to such requests until they have been approved by DDOT.

DDOT: The requests are outside the scope of the proceeding.

²⁷ In 2005, the Federal Railroad Administration issued its Report to Congress: Baltimore's Railroad Network: Challenges and Alternatives, and projected that the number of CSX trains traveling between Washington and Baltimore will increase from 33 trains a day in 2012 to a high of 56 trains a day in 2050. Page 4-13. This projection, performed in 2005, did not take into account the increased freight that will result from expansion of the Panama Canal.

containers, would likely be carried by CSX on double stacked container trains, resulting in heavier loads, requiring double locomotives. Even today, a large number of the CSX trains coming through our City use double locomotives. For the purpose of estimating diesel emissions, the relevant unit is the number of locomotives rather than of trains.

20-34

The Number of Commuter Rail and Amtrak Trips Is Projected to Double

The goal of the Union Station expansion is to triple the number of riders and double the number of passenger and commuter trains using the station.²⁸ The southbound tracks at Union station will be designed for expanded commuter rail as well and Amtrak's Superliner and the tracks will be equipped with an overhead catenary system to accommodate electric locomotives (*USMP*, page 11). Between 2018 and 2022, all new tracks will run through the First Street tunnel to points south of DC (*id.* page 22). Additional future tracks could be extended to the south, enabling extension of high-performance, high-speed rail service to Virginia, North Carolina and the southeastern United States (*id.* page 13).

A cornerstone of the recently adopted Southwest Ecodistrict Plan is to through-run MARC service from Maryland to Virginia and to increase the number of commuter and Amtrak trains using L'Enfant Station. The Plan relies upon these transportation strategies to revitalize and reconnect the community²⁹ The SWE Plan builds on the District's Maryland Avenue SW Small Area Plan through an expanded L'Enfant commuter rail station that will serve VRE, MARC, and Amtrak commuters with convenient access to the L'Enfant Plaza Metro Station's Blue/Orange and Yellow/Green Line service (*SWE*, page 31).

The DEIS Needs to be Revised to Estimate Airborne Emissions Associated with an Expanded Range of Alternatives, Including the Separation of Freight and Passenger/Commuter Rail with Freight Rail Re-Routed Outside the Monumental Core

20-35

Response to Comment 20-35

The DEIS considered the concept of rerouting freight outside the Monumental Core and eliminated it as an alternative for this proposed action. The alternatives included in the DEIS, and their evaluation, are sufficient given the purpose and need of the Project.

The estimates should be based on the following information:

- ♥ Projected Increases in Freight, Passenger and Commuter Rail Services
- ♥ Number, Types, and Ages of Locomotives and Associated Airborne Emissions
 - Where Possible, Make Short-Term Calculations Based on Existing Fleet
 - Emissions from Passenger and Commuter Rail Services Should be Computed for Both Diesel and Electric Locomotives

²⁸ *Union Station Master Plan*, Washington, DC, July 25, 2012, Executive Summary, page 2.

²⁹ The plan is to increase the number of jobs and residents and to "build on existing road, rail and bus infrastructure to enhance transportation capacity ... and better connect all modes of travel." (Page 13)

- Where Electrification is Assumed, Include Emissions Associated with the Generation of Electricity
- ♥ Estimated Travel Times for Each Type of Service
- ♥ Increases in Automotive VMT and Associated Emissions if Commuter Rail Growth is Constrained
- ♥ For Alternatives Involving Re-Routing:
 - Baseline Air Quality
 - Population Subject to Exposure
 - Environmental Equity Analysis³⁰

Air Quality Benefits of Rerouting CSX

Studies that have been done about concentrations of vehicle emissions near major highways also apply to the diesel emission levels from trains traversing the SE tracks and the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. There is substantial documentation that people living or otherwise spending significant time within 200 meters +/- of major highways and freeways are exposed to freshly-emitted air pollutants of particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide more so than persons living at a greater distance, even compared to living on busy urban streets. Relative concentrations of these airborne emissions decrease exponentially between 17 and 150 meters downwind from the highways, while at 300 meters measurable emissions concentrations were the same as at upwind sites.³¹ An Australian study observed that the distance from highways at which concentrations of airborne pollutants created by vehicles using the highway decreased by 50% varied from 100 to 375 meters depending on the wind speed and direction.³²

Rerouting CSX trains away from the SW tracks and the Virginia Avenue Tunnel would result in dilution of the airborne emissions proportionate to the distance of the relocation. Relocating the CSX tracks more than 1,000 feet to the east would mean lower levels of diesel emission and less harmful effects to the residents, workers and visitors as well as harm to the limestone and marble of the Capitol, the Mall and government buildings that are adjacent to the SW tracks and the Virginia Avenue Tunnel.

The Implications of These Airborne Pollutants

Response to Comment 20-36

The focus of this EIS is on the reconstruction of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Among the concepts considered were a tunnel under the entirety of DC as well as rerouting around the DC metropolitan area and they were not included as alternatives for this proposed action. It is not clear how the commenter proposes to relocate the tracks 1000 feet to the east.

³⁰ See, e.g., NCPC and DDOT, *Freight Railroad Realignment Feasibility Study: Securing Freight Rail Transportation in the National Capital Region*, April 2007, pp. ES-8 and 9 and pp. 67-71.

³¹ <http://www.ehjournal.net/content/6/1/23>

³² Hitchens J, Morawska L, Wolff R, Gilbert D. Concentrations of submicrometre particles from vehicle emissions near a major road. *Atmospheric Environment*. 2000;34:51–59. doi: 10.1016/S1352-2310(99)00304-0.

Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) are a key precursor to ozone and secondary Particulate Matter (PM) formation. As the EPA explained in evaluating the comments about adopting the now current Locomotive emissions standards³³:

Ozone and PM2.5 are associated with serious public health problems including premature mortality, aggravation of respiratory and cardiovascular disease, aggravation of existing asthma, acute respiratory symptoms, chronic bronchitis, and decreased lung function. These engines also emit hazardous air pollutants or air toxics, which are also associated with serious adverse health effects. These engines emissions are of particular concern, as exposure to diesel exhaust has been judged likely to pose a lung cancer hazard for humans as well as a hazard from non-cancer respiratory effects.

The area in the vicinity of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel and the SW rail tracks is currently a maintenance area for CO, a marginal nonattainment area for O3 and a nonattainment area for PM2.5 (DEIS page 4-35).

Nitrogen Oxide emissions also pose threats to natural resources and to the built environment. The EPA provided the following summary³⁴:

The Northwest Environmental Defense Center, et al. noted that recent Forest Service studies have shown that NOx and other emissions from sources in and around the Columbia River Gorge contribute to acid rain formation, resulting in damage to crops, ecosystems, and cultural artifacts, including ancient Native American rock images.

No response required for this section of comment

The limestone and marble buildings on the Mall, as well as other federal buildings, are adjacent to the SW tracks and the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, and the U.S. Capitol is only four blocks away.

As EPA has noted:

The deposition of airborne particles can reduce the aesthetic appeal of culturally important articles through soiling, and can contribute directly (or in conjunction with other pollutants) to structural damage by means of corrosion or erosion.³⁵

Reducing the emission of NOx will benefit the air quality in terms of the health of workers and residents in the area as well as visitors to the Mall and preservation of the limestone and marble memorials and museums of the Mall and the U.S. Capitol.

Conclusion

³³ EPA420-R-08-006 March 2008, page 2-1 to 202

³⁴ Id. at 2-15

³⁵ Id at 2-18.

Dedication of the SW tracks and the Long Bridge for use only by passenger and commuter rail will allow electrification of those tracks. The emissions associated with the amount of electric generation to power those locomotives should be far less than the emissions associated with using diesel locomotives to move commuter and passenger trains. By rerouting CSX trains away from the Monumental Core, freight emissions will be diluted to the point that their harmful effects would be greatly reduced by the time they reach the Mall, the Capitol and the downtown area.

20-37

Response to Comment 20-37

Electrification of CSX's mainline is not a part of this project. General [transportation] conformity was followed as defined by USEPA. The air quality modeling presented in the DEIS uses the appropriate USEPA modeling methodology, as described in the tech report included as an appendix to this document. It properly reflects the projected air quality impacts of this construction project. Rebuilding Virginia Avenue Tunnel will not constrain passenger rail service. The DEIS considered the concept of rerouting freight outside the Monumental Core and eliminated it as an alternative for this proposed action. As described in Section 3.2, rerouting concepts were considered, but eliminated from further consideration. Alternative 3 was selected as the Preferred Alternative.

Identifying Alternative Routes

The Virginia Avenue Tunnel is a product of late-19th century decisionmaking about appropriate locations for rail facilities. It is one of the last remnants of a time when trains ran up and down the national Mall. Now that even its owner acknowledges that this tunnel is obsolete and no longer meets CSX's needs, the Committee of 100 believes that it is imperative that we re-examine the question of location as we update our rail infrastructure to prepare for 21st century technology and traffic volumes.

The fact that the DEIS, as currently written, has not fully evaluated any re-routing alternative renders it a pointless bureaucratic exercise rather than a useful comparison of the environmental costs and benefits associated with a range of possible solutions to the problem of capacity constraints imposed on rail service by antiquated infrastructure. In both DC and Baltimore, when independent agencies looked comprehensively at this issue their conclusion was that separating freight rail from passenger and commuter rail was an essential step toward creating a rail system that can meet future needs.³⁶

Yet this draft EIS summarily dismisses that possibility and starts from the premise that the only alternatives worth considering are those that involve substantial reinvestment in perpetuating a system that is already proving unworkable. Rather than assume that the only approach to solving the problems posed by the Virginia Avenue Tunnel is to make the Tunnel bigger, the DEIS should fully evaluate a different possibility – that abandoning the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, separating freight and rail traffic, and re-routing most freight traffic around rather than through the center of the city may be the most environmentally responsible approach. 20-38

The DEIS's failure to develop and analyze genuine alternatives (rather than minor variations on a theme) stems from four fundamental flaws in this NEPA process thus far:

- ♥ An unduly narrow Statement of Purpose and Need, which ignored the interests of stakeholders other than the applicant (CSX) 20-39
- ♥ An exclusive focus on the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, and a corresponding failure to define logical termini – which FHWA warns is likely to result in a project that will “cause unexpected side effects” and/or “only peripherally meet project needs”³⁷ 20-40

³⁶ See National Capital Planning Commission and District Department of Transportation, *Freight Railroad Realignment Feasibility Study: Securing Freight Rail Transportation in the National Capital Region*, April 2007, pp. 101-02; and Federal Railroad Administration, *Report to Congress: Baltimore's Railroad Network (2005)*, Part II: Alternatives, p. 9-3. <http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L04159>

³⁷ NEPA and Transportation Decisionmaking: Development and Evaluation of Alternatives, <http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/tdmalts.asp>

Response to Comment 20-38

As the EIS demonstrates, the goal of this project is to improve aging infrastructure in time to meet the anticipated demand of additional freight traffic from the expanded Panama Canal. The extended period to implement a rerouting concept does not satisfy this goal. However, moving forward with this project does not preclude the implementation of a rerouting concept at some point in the future.

Response to Comment 20-39

This project's purpose and need is to address the deficiencies of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Section 5.15 of the DEIS describes how passenger rail and freight coexist in the region.

Response to Comment 20-40

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project. However, the EIS should and does address relevant freight rail transportation and public impacts of this project. Chapter 2 of the FEIS was revised to include discussion regarding the independent utility and logical termini of the project.

♥ The absence of the specific data necessary to evaluate project costs, benefits, and needs. (e.g. current and projected traffic volumes, infrastructural capacity, origins/destinations of freight traveling through Washington DC) 20-41

♥ A largely a-contextual approach to project evaluation, rather than an assessment of compatibility with other relevant local and national transportation and land use planning initiatives. 20-42

Rerouting Concepts Have Been Summarily Dismissed

CSX is only interested in looking at scenarios that involve expanding the existing tunnel because that approach is the fastest, cheapest, and easiest way for them to solve their immediate problem. But one of the reasons we have a NEPA process is that corporate decisionmaking on this model frequently yields results that have major externalities and impose long-term costs on other parties and on the public sphere that far exceed the savings incurred by the decisionmaker. As we have been arguing throughout these comments, the expansion of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel seems quite likely to be just this sort of decision.

It is therefore imperative that the NEPA process produce a factual, detailed, and comprehensive analysis of the comparative costs and benefits of alternative approaches to solving the problems that compel the replacement of our antiquated rail infrastructure. The Draft EIS released in July falls far short of this mark.

The DEIS Needs to Be Redone to Evaluate Additional Concepts

The DEIS has simply lifted from the 2007 NCPD Railroad Realignment Study the concepts that would provide for rerouting of CSX away from the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, without examining any other rerouting concepts considered in the past, or any variation of those alternative concepts. We suggest that NCPD be asked to update its 2007 analysis and to propose the route(s) that they believe offer the most promising alternatives to expansion of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. We believe that opportunities for new alignments may have presented themselves since that report. For example, The Potomac River Generating Plant, owned by GenOn, just north of Alexandria has been decommissioned and is currently undergoing demolition and environmental clean up. This location provides a clean slate for constructing the Virginia side of a new Potomac River crossing. 20-43

The current track configuration is depicted on the CSX website. [See the map on the following page.] Just north of Alexandria a spur line heads to the Potomac River, to serve Robinson Terminal.

The two short stubs off of that spur line were used to serve the Potomac Generating Plant. On the Anacostia side the rail tracks that served Blue Plains and other customers, the same tracks to which the 1997 NCPD realignment would have connected, have been enhanced for visibility.

Response to Comment 20-41


Sections 2.2 and 2.3 have been revised in the FEIS to address these concerns.

Response to Comment 20-42

Rebuilding the VA tunnel is being done in anticipation of increased demand for freight rail service. With or without the project, the amount of freight moving through the District will increase. As described in Section 5.15.1, the Build Alternatives will allow CSX to accommodate this growth in freight transportation demand more efficiently, which may benefit passenger service using CSX rail lines in Virginia and the District. Making the tunnel double stack capable allows twice the amount of intermodal container freight to be carried per train. Additionally, eliminating the single track bottleneck at the Virginia Avenue Tunnel increases the fluidity of both freight and passenger rail service on this portion of the network. This project does not preclude future discussions on other passenger and freight rail projects.

Response to Comment 20-43

This proposal is not a reasonable alternative because it presents a number of infirmities including the rerouting of a major railroad from an existing longstanding right-of-way through a new structure over the Potomac River and then using another right-of-way that is of critical importance to the DC government for other purposes.

**Legend**

- CSX Rail Network
- Blue Plains Line

To identify alternative routings, CSX's basic requirements should be supplemented with additional criteria, encompassing a broader range of needs, interests, and stakeholders. An alternative route should:

- 1: Provide a continuous double-tracked railway to accommodate double stacked container trains;
- 2: Accommodate expansion of passenger and commuter rail services
- 3: Separate passenger and commuter rail infrastructure from freight infrastructure, allowing each system to be optimized for its specific use

20-44

Response to Comment 20-44

The additional criteria suggested are not consistent with the purpose and need of the project. Moreover, your criteria 6 and 7 would not favor a reroute concept.

- 4: Address the safety and security concerns associated with high-volume freight operations near population centers and national landmarks;
- 5: Locate freight tracks at least 1000 feet away from the Capitol and Monumental Core to provide dilution of the emissions that CSX diesel locomotives would continue to produce;
- 6: Minimize the amount of new and rebuilt tracks and
- 7: Utilize existing tracks and rights of way to the extent possible

20-44

Consider A New Potomac River Rail Crossing

The separation of freight and passenger/commuter rail infrastructure may require a new Potomac River crossing. This cross could be either a bridge or a tunnel. In the *MidAtlantic Rail Operations Phase I Report* of 2002, CSX proposed an additional Potomac River double track bridge at a cost of \$300 million (*Mid-Atlantic Rail Operations Phase II Report*, December 2009 page 2-11) that amounts to a current estimate of \$327 million for a new Potomac River rail bridge.³⁸ A tunnel would also be a viable option. Locating the tunnel below the bed of the Potomac River, which at this point is about 30 feet deep, would require greatly reduced approach slopes, a shorter total length and much less expense than the 80 foot deep, nine mile long tunnel that the DEIS considered as Concept 8.³⁹

We now have the equipment to bore a tunnel under the Potomac River, and if necessary, under the Blue Plains right-of-way. In April of this year, WASA unveiled *Lady Bird*, a massive tunnel boring machine that is now being used to drill a huge 4-mile long tunnel from Blue Plains, under the Potomac, and up the Anacostia, to the Main Sewage Pumping Station near Nationals Stadium. Boring machines have been successfully used in railway applications.⁴⁰

20-45

For some alignments, such as Blue Plains, tunnel boring under existing rights-of-way may be more practical than attempting to reconstruct surface tracks, given subsequent redevelopment. Another possibility would be to lower the tracks and deck over them, like the SW tracks along a part of Maryland Avenue or perhaps a Virginia Avenue type of shallow tunnel in order to coexist with the development that has occurred in this area. The possibility of using a tunnel boring machine for all or part of this work needs to be evaluated.

Response to Comment 20-45

This proposal is not a reasonable alternative because it presents a number of infirmities including the rerouting of a major railroad from an existing longstanding right-of-way through a new structure over the Potomac River and then using another right-of-way that is of critical importance to the DC government for other purposes.

³⁸ The conversion from 2009 dollars to 2013 dollars used the CPI inflation calculator. <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=300&year1=2009&year2=2013>

³⁹ NCPC proposed a rail tunnel under the Potomac River between Virginia and Anacostia in their 1997 plan *Extending the Legacy: Planning America's Capital for the 21st Century*.

⁴⁰ In 1993, The Canadian National Ry. Co. (CN) constructed a new bored railroad tunnel between Port Huron, MI, and Sarnia, Ontario, to replace a 100-year old tunnel in order to accommodate trains of double-stack container cars. The cost of the one-mile tunnel was estimated at \$155 million or about \$250 million in today's dollars.

Conclusion

The above discussion is meant to illustrate, on a conceptual level, that there are alternative alignments, alternative configurations and alternative construction methods that could re-route CSX trains away from the SW tracks and the Long Bridge, and by doing so, save the cost and physical disruption of having to reconstruct the Virginia Avenue tunnel. The Committee of 100 strongly recommends that these and other possible alternate alignments be further developed and included in the DEIS.

20-46

Response to Comment 20-46

Three of the reroute concepts included a new Potomac River crossing, two by bridge and one by tunnel. They were all eliminated from further consideration, as described in the DEIS. Please see revised Section 3.7 in the FEIS on alternatives selection process. Alternative 3 was selected as the Preferred Alternative.

Section 4(f) Commentary

The Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation of the DEIS addresses Section 4(f) of the U.S. Transportation Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. §303). This Act pertains to the use of publicly-owned parks, recreation areas and land of a historic site. That “use” includes temporary or permanent occupancy of any of those designated properties or resources and is permitted only if there is no feasible and prudent avoidance alternative. Reconstruction of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, by means of any of the three tunnel rebuild alternatives, would require use of 4(f) resources or properties. That use requires the approval of Federal Highway Administration. Before that use can be approved by the FHWA an evaluation of the Section 4(f) properties or resources is required to determine if there are any feasible and prudent avoidance alternatives. The evaluation is required to take into account all possible planning to minimize harm to the section 4(f) properties or resources (23 CFR §774.17). The Evaluation is required to encompass resources or properties that will be directly affected by the reconstruction, what is referred to in the DEIS as the “limits of disturbance”. According to the Evaluation, the affected properties are (page 5):

Virginia Avenue Tunnel
The L’Enfant Plan of Washington, DC
Capitol Hill Historic District
Virginia Avenue Park

The Evaluation Fails to Address Permanent Use

The Evaluation addresses the impact on Virginia Avenue only during construction and in terms of the need to temporarily occupy part of Virginia Avenue to accomplish trenching to provide space for construction and to provide different configurations of “run around” tracks for continued CSX operations while the existing tunnel is demolished and then rebuilt.

The Evaluation concedes that the “use” would not be a *de minimis* impact, the trenching would not be minor, and the use would be adverse in terms of Section 106 “due to the temporary occupancy of a contributing element (Virginia Avenue SE) to the L’Enfant Plan” (page 12). But the Evaluation fails to address the permanent use of a part of Virginia Avenue.⁴¹ 20-47

While the Section 4(f) Evaluation does not discuss this permanent incursion into public space, page 3-5 of the DEIS concedes this fact, but without quantifying the amount of incursion:

⁴¹ Alternative 2 would shift the center line of the tunnel seven feet south, Alternative 3 would shift the center line 25 feet to the south and Alternative 4 would shift the center line 17 feet to the south (DEIS 3.2.1.1-3.2.1.4). Because these measurements are framed in terms of the “center line” only, it is unclear how far the tunnel footprint is being expanded to accommodate the second track proposed by each alternative. The tunnel footprint appears to shift by up to 50 feet. These would be permanent increases in the footprint of the tunnel. The run-around tracks and construction access space required during construction that would extend even further beyond the 1901 right-of-way.

Response to Comment 20-47

Section 8.2 of the Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation stated that Virginia Avenue SE will be restored at the end of construction.

Because all three Build Alternatives described in this Draft EIS contemplate that the reconstructed tunnel would only be located within CSX owned or public property, rather than intruding into or under any private property, no additional detail beyond those already presented here is warranted [emphasis added].

The right-of-way for the Virginia Avenue tunnel was granted pursuant to 1901 statute. All of the proposed alternatives for rebuilding the tunnel involve widening the tunnel beyond that 1901 right-of-way into the right-of-way of Virginia Avenue.⁴²

In addition to the L'Enfant alignment of Virginia Avenue, there are also DC-owned (or administered) rights-of-way for Virginia Avenue for places where the present Virginia Avenue alignment deviates from the L'Enfant alignment. For example, between 4th and 5th/₆th Streets SE “the alignment bows to the south, deviating from the original L'Enfant Plan alignment” (Evaluation, page 26). Thus, in addition to the L'Enfant property use, there is also the proposed permanent use of publicly-owned property that is not addressed in the DEIS: the rights-of-way of the changed alignment of Virginia Avenue. Neither the proposed permanent use of the L'Enfant property nor the proposed use of publicly-owned property (the DC administered rights-of-way due to the current Virginia Avenue alignment) is addressed in the Evaluation.

20-48

Response to Comment 20-48

As described in Section 8.2 of the Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation, the Section 4(f) use of the L'Enfant Plan of the City of Washington, DC would only occur during construction.

The Evaluation Did Not Consider Feasible and Prudent Alternatives

The project cannot use Section 4(f) properties or resources unless it is determined that there is no feasible and prudent avoidance alternatives and the evaluation takes into account all possible planning to minimize harm to the section 4 (f) properties (23 CFR §774.17).

These are feasible and prudent avoidance alternatives and both the DEIS and Evaluation need to be redone to evaluate these alternatives and to perform realistic and pragmatic planning to minimize harm to the Section 4 (f) properties, and also to evaluate impacts to commuter rail, Amtrak, air quality and safety and security.

20-49

Response to Comment 20-49

The Section 4(f) Evaluation in the FEIS concludes there is no feasible and prudent alternative that avoids the use of the identified Section 4(f) resources.

As explained in the Revisiting Alternative Routes section above, neither the DEIS nor the Evaluation addresses the tunnel crossing from Alexandria, south of National Airport, to Anacostia, that would connect to the existing CSX track at the Benning Yard as proposed by NCPD in their 1997 report.

20-50

Response to Comment 20-50

Thank you for providing your comment. Your comment has been noted. At the commenter's request we have reexamined the 4(f) request and concluded it satisfies all requirements.

Neither the DEIS nor the Evaluation considered the recent decommissioning of the Potomac River generating plant as a potential beginning point for such a crossing to Anacostia that would connect with the Blue Plains tracks and right-of-way.

⁴² See 31 Stat 767 (Feb. 12, 1901). The DEIS does not cite any authority that might interpret this 1901 statute as granting right-of-way to CSX beyond the boundaries of the current tunnel. Nor does the DEIS cite any subsequent statutory or other authority granting CSX additional right of way for the tunnel.

Nor did the DEIS or the Evaluation consider whether a tunnel or a bridge would be most appropriate for such a crossing or whether it would be feasible to recondition the surface tracks that formerly supplied Blue Plain or whether a tunnel or decked-over tracks under that right-of-way would be more appropriate.

20-51

The Evaluation Used the Wrong Standard

In evaluating impacts of the alternative routings on each of the four Section 4(f) resources and properties the Evaluation rejects all of the alternative routings that were considered, primarily because they do not meet the Purpose and Needs for the project. The problems associated with the biased Statement of Purpose and Needs have already been discussed. The impacts of alternative routings need to be re-evaluated after a revised Statement is issued. That revision should:

- Develop a Purpose and Need Statement to address the deficiencies explained in these comments;
- Allow for expansion of Amtrak as described in the *Union Station Master Plan*;
- Allow for expansion of commuter rail as described in the *SW Ecodistrict Plan*;
- Quantify the commuter benefits of expanded Amtrak and commuter rail service;
- Provide for continued (and expanded) operation of passenger and commuter rail on the tracks in SW DC that connect to the First Street Tunnel leading to Union Station;
- Eliminate any restrictions that would prevent electrification of those tracks;
- Compute the environmental effects of those changes; and
- Evaluate the safety and security benefits of rerouting CSX away from downtown, the Monumental Core and the U.S. Capitol.

20-52

The alternatives that would reroute CSX away from the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, the SW Tracks, the Long Bridge and the Anacostia Lift Bridge all assume that the Virginia Avenue tunnel would have to “remain to service Washington Metropolitan Area regional customers” (Evaluation, page 15). The apparent rationale for this statement is that CSX has freight delivery customers in SW that it will have to continue to serve. In fact, the only existing customer is the Capitol Heating Plant, now fueled by natural gas, with coal as a back-up fuel. But the plant is being converted to a co-generation plant, fueled by natural gas, and the back-up fuel will be oil. By the time that any of the tunnel rebuild Alternatives could be accomplished, there will no longer be CSX freight delivery customers along the SW tracks.

20-53

Response to Comment 20-51

This proposal is not a reasonable alternative because it presents a number of infirmities including the rerouting of a major railroad from an existing longstanding right-of-way through a new structure over the Potomac River and then using another right-of-way that is of critical importance to the DC government for other purposes.

Response to Comment 20-52

As described in Section 9 of the Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation, the avoidance alternatives were evaluated based on their feasibility and prudence in addressing the purpose and need of the project.

Response to Comment 20-53

In 2013, more than 368,000 carloads of rail freight originated in or was delivered to the District by CSX. As of 2013, CSX provides serves three customers in the District and two just over the District border in Maryland. There are also other properties in the District that connect to CSX's line, and CSX is currently engaged in discussions with two new potential rail customers in the District. There are also efforts by the City Council to preserve existing industrial zoning for properties with rail connections and outreach to promote further economic development in the District. The products received and shipped by these District customers include lumber, scrap metal, recycling materials, transformers, and aggregate. CSX is anticipating the continuation of service to Metropolitan Washington customers into the future.

Conclusion

The Committee of 100 recommends that the DEIS be revised to address the deficiencies described in these comments, and that the DC Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration adopt the No-Build Option until such time as the DEIS can be substantially revised to adequately consider serious operational and physical concerns and consider the short and long term benefits of the separation of freight from commuter and passenger rail service. The revised DEIS should:

- Address the deficiencies identified in these comments;
- Facilitate the proposed expansion of Amtrak service at Union Station;
- Facilitate the proposed expansion of commuter rail service;
- Quantify the commuter benefits of these changes;
- Eliminate any restrictions that would prevent electrification of SW DC tracks;
- Compute the environmental effects of electrification; and
- Evaluate the safety and security benefits of rerouting CSX away from dense population areas including the downtown, the Monumental Core and the U. S. Capitol grounds.

No response required for this section of comment

Respectfully Submitted,

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